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Abstract: Revolts in Tunisia and Egypt have led many observers to speak of the “first 
digital revolution” in the Arab world. Social media sites, such as Twitter and Facebook, are 
now recognised as the important tools that facilitated the “Jasmine Revolution”. In fact, the 
willingness of the Mubarak government to block all internet connection in Egypt has 
demonstrated the concern over the power of new technologies in facilitating political 
change. The tenacity of the social movements that are still on-going in the Arab world 
continues to demonstrate the important role that networked technologies—such as the 
internet, satellite channels and social networking sites—play in revolutions. The 
revolutions demonstrate an effective use of social media and other network technologies as 
an organisational tool, and as a means of asserting pressure on current rulers and future 
governments. Accordingly, this article seeks to expose freedom of expression as a 
fundamental democratic principle and the internet network as a vehicle driving the 
demonstrations in the Arab countries of Tunisia and Egypt.  
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“The regime of Hosni Mubarak has committed the greatest curtailment of freedom in its 
blocking all access to the Internet. Neither Burma in 2007, China in 2008, or Iran in 2009 
would have gone as far as Egypt to rewrite the pages of history.” 
Libération, 28 January 2011 [1].  
1. Introduction 
New communication technologies have significantly changed the way in which individuals interact 
and have created a new space for freedom of expression. They have allowed individuals to freely 
express themselves and disseminate their views and opinions to a wide global audience. From a 
political viewpoint, the internet has provided a significant opportunity for human rights advocates to 
defend civil liberties, which is particularly valuable to nations where freedom of expression is 
suppressed. At the same time, technologies have also been used to repress free speech, and curtail 
online political dissidence.  
Revolts in Tunisia and Egypt have led many observers to speak of the “first digital revolution” in 
the Arab world. Social media sites, such as Twitter and Facebook, are now recognised as the important 
tools that facilitated the “Jasmine Revolution”. In fact, the willingness of the Mubarak government to 
block all internet connection in Egypt has demonstrated the concern over the power of new 
technologies in facilitating political change. The tenacity of social movements, that is still on-going in 
the Arab world, continues to demonstrate the important role that networked technologies—such as the 
internet, satellite channels and social networking sites play in revolutions. The revolutions demonstrate 
an effective use of social media and other network technologies as an organisational tool, and as a 
means of asserting pressure on current rulers and future governments. Accordingly, this article seeks to 
expose freedom of expression as a fundamental democratic principle, and the internet network as a 
vehicle driving the demonstrations in the Arab countries of Tunisia and Egypt. 
2. Freedom of Expression and Democratic Principles 
Freedom of expression has two main aspects: the passive aspect and the active aspect. The former 
belongs to the listener and consists of the ability to receive information, while the latter supports the 
interests of the speaker and is concerned with the ability to communicate information [2]. Notably, the 
passive aspect was recognised by the drafters of the European Convention of Human Rights, which 
considered the right of the public to receive information under Article 10. Thus, as a recognised 
freedom, any interference with this freedom would affect a public right. Freedom of expression not 
only includes the right of an individual to disseminate his or her opinions, but also the right for 
members of the public to access this information.  
The second aspect is concerned with the right to freely communicate ideas or information so as to 
make them known. This aspect follows logically from the first aspect in that, in order for a person to 
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develop their opinions to share with others, he or she must have had free availability and unlimited 
access to information and ideas [2]. This will be explored in more detail in the following section.  
2.1. Freedom of Expression  
The history of the law of freedom of expression and of its judicial application is a result of a 
succession of breakthroughs and setbacks. In analysing freedom of expression, courts and academics 
have advanced two major theories to explain the rationale behind the protection of freedom of speech: 
the utilitarian theory and the libertarian theory [3–5]. The utilitarian theory of free speech espouses the 
idea that speech is a tool to advance truth, democracy, and the exchange of ideas. For instance, this 
theory has been used in some American decisions. Justice Brennan of the United States Supreme Court 
in Roth v. United States wrote, “[t]he protection given to speech and the press was fashioned to assure 
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the 
people” [6]. Libertarian theory, meanwhile, maintains that the protection of speech is an end in itself, 
which secures dignity by protecting an individual’s right to develop intellectually and spiritually 
through expressive means [5]. The libertarian model seeks to protect individual self-determination 
rather than any specific right.  
It is important to note that freedom of expression does not operate in isolation but, rather, it is tied 
to the right to strike, the right of association, the rights of protest and demonstration, and freedom of 
the press. These five indicators are generally used to determine the political nature and democracy of a 
society [7]. Therefore it is appropriate to consider the two most influential international treaties on the 
matter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration) [8] and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) [9]. Both Egypt and Tunisia have signed the Declaration, and 
both have signed and ratified the ICCPR. 
The Declaration is a milestone document, which reflects an attempt to promote fundamental rights and 
freedoms, and to promote liberal democratic societies. It is a document intended to set an international 
standard of human rights, though the Declaration is non-binding and has no enforcement mechanisms. 
The United States was the first democratic State to recognise the importance and value of freedom of 
expression, but the United Nations was the first to give this right a universal character by the adoption 
of the Declaration December 1948. Of particular importance is Article 19, which provides that: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to 
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers. 
The ICCPR was adopted in New York on 16 December 1966 by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations in its resolution. It came into force on 23 March 1976. It is binding on each of the State 
signatories. Egypt ratified the treaty in 1982 while Tunisia ratified in 1969.  
Freedom of expression plays a fundamental role in democratic societies. It is guaranteed under 
Article 19 of the ICCPR, which provides:  
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(1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.  
(2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in 
writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.  
(3) The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties 
and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be 
such as are provided by law and are necessary:  
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;  
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health 
or morals.  
Article 19(2) specifically recognises that everyone has a right to freedom of expression by any 
means of media of his or her choice. This anticipates the emergence of new technological 
advancements. Thus, although the internet did not exist in 1966, it is undeniable that “any other media” 
includes the internet and is not restricted to the types of communication available in that era. Article 
19(3) recognises that freedom of expression is qualified in that it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities. Accordingly, the right of expression is subject to certain restrictions imposed by law, 
such as where national or public security is threatened. The ICCPR therefore limits freedom of 
individuals to express themselves where it would interfere with the fulfilment of his or her duties 
towards others and the community. New technological communication, as will be seen later, may also 
be affected by these restrictions. 
2.2. Freedom of Expression in Egypt 
Egypt signed the ICCPR in August 1967 but did not ratify until January 1982. Thus, it is legally 
bound by its provisions and is obligated to give effect to the treaty through its domestic laws. Egyptian 
freedom of expression, however, has vacillated between relatively strong protection to relatively weak 
protection. In recent times, Egypt’s freedom of expression has been significantly weakened by a series 
of laws, and exceptions outlined in the nation’s various Constitutions. 
Egypt has had several Constitutions in its history. The most recent have been the Constitution of the 
Arab Republic of Egypt 1971 [10], and the Constitution of 2012 [11] that succeeded it. Under the 
former, freedom of expression was protected under Article 47, which guaranteed freedom of opinion, 
stating that “[e]very individual has the right to express his opinion and to disseminate it verbally, in 
writing, illustration or by other means within the limits of the law”. The Constitution of 2012 was 
referred to informally as the “Muslim Brotherhood Constitution of 2012” with reference to the then 
President Morsi’s association with the Muslim Brotherhood group. Under the Constitution of 2012 
freedom of expression was highly problematic in that it placed broad restrictions on certain speech. 
Most problematic was the provision that stated a person cannot “insult a human”, which meant that, for 
example, a person could be censored for criticizing the president [12]. This hurriedly drafted 
Constitution was also criticized for being “undemocratic” [13] and given its limited protection of the 
expression rights of minorities, such as women and religious minority groups [12]. 
In 2011, Egyptians took to the streets to protest their gross dissatisfaction with the dictator Mubarak 
who later resigned. In the lead-up to the election following Mubarak’s resignation, the Egyptian army 
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temporarily held power. In a democratic election of 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood was elected with 
the extremist Morsi coming into power. Dissatisfaction continued amongst the Egyptians with millions 
of Egyptians taking to the street on 30 June 2013 and occupying critical locations such as Tahir Square 
to protest against the Morsi government [14] though as the movement progressed, the numbers 
lessened to tens of thousands remaining at protest sites. The army once again intervened, issued a 48 
hour ultimatum for Morsi to resign, and then later placed Morsi under detention as he refused to resign. 
Adly Mansour, head of Egypt’s highest court, became the interim President. Under Adly Mansour, a 
draft Constitution was negotiated between political parties in 2013, with a referendum in early 2014 [15]. 
According to the Egyptian website Aswat Masriya, over 98% of Egyptians voted in favour of the new 
Constitution with a 38.9% turnout [16]. The new Constitution that has recently been adopted by the 
Egyptian Assembly contains a number of important changes that are hoped to prevent the effects of future 
dictators, extremists and excessive foreign interference on future Egyptian governments [17]. The last 
two Presidents, Mubarak and Morsi, have both been tried on criminal charges. Very little information 
about the trials has been made public, instead it has been very much controlled by the state [18]. 
Some of the key features of Egypt’s new Constitution include the secularization of politics by 
banning religious political parties, the enshrining of freedom of religion and freedom of expression, 
and the strengthening of the army. While the new Constitution greatly strengthens religious freedom 
under Article 64, it has removed a former provision that would allow political parties to adopt law 
adopted from Shariah or the Muslim legal code. Article 65 guarantees freedom of thought and opinion. 
Article 70 establishes freedom of journalism and Article 71 prohibits censorship, confiscation, 
suspension, or closure of Egyptian media. In spite of these strongly worded provisions promoting 
human rights, there have been a number of controversial aspects to the new Constitution which 
undermine how “free” the new Constitution is, or will be. Television, for instance, will still be 
regulated by the State. Censorship is also still allowed during times of war or public mobilisation. 
While the new Constitution abolished the former police state provisions forbidding private meetings 
without permission, a newly passed law forbids demonstrations without a police license. As one 
commentator has written, “It is ironic that the provisions banning censorship and establishing freedom 
of speech were passed on a day when dissident Ahmad Maher was arrested for thought crimes (his 
criticism of the anti-protest law)” [19]. Although freedom of expression is protected under Egyptian 
law and Egypt is bound by the provisions in the ICCPR, legal rules and norms do not protect freedom 
of expressions in times of unrest as illustrated in many events post coup. 
Al Jazeera journalists, Baher Mohaed, Mohamed Fahmy, and Peter Greste, were arrested for their 
coverage of the military’s removal of Morsi. These journalists were held for more than 200 days [20] 
and were each sentenced from seven to ten years of imprisonment for allegedly aiding a terrorist 
organization. Part of the contention lies in the current government’s classification of the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a terrorist group. In December 2013, the Egyptian government officially classified the 
group as a terrorist organization according to news accounts of the events [21]. Not all journalists 
agreed with the classification including those arrested as well as a number of other journalists [22]. 
These arrests and sentences have been highly criticized internationally to the point where the situation 
is being called “the war on free speech”. The journalists were charged with producing false news 
reports, thereby aiding the Brotherhood. It is a difficult leap in logic, and one can certainly see why the 
Laws 2014, 3 679 
 
characterization of Egypt’s last three governments, has done little to protect freedom of expression in 
Egypt. The war on free speech continues to rage in spite of the new Constitution. 
2.3. Freedom of Expression in Tunisia 
Tunisia signed the ICCPR on 30 April 1968 and ratified it on 18 March 1969. Thus, by ratifying the 
ICCPR, Tunisia is legally bound by its provisions and is obligated to give effect to the treaty through 
its domestic laws. Despite this, Tunisians have historically been subject to an array of repressive laws 
that violate freedom of expression. It is these repressive laws and authoritarian conditions that led to 
the uprising and the subsequent removal of President Ben Ali in 2011. Article 121(3) of the Tunisian 
Penal Code was frequently used to restrict speech. The Code made it an offence for anyone to 
distribute, sell or display in public any material that would “disturb public order or undermine public 
morality” [23]. While the ICCPR, as well as the Tunisian Constitution of 1959, protect freedom of 
expression Tunisians were unable to avoid the continuous violations on this freedom [24]. 
The internet, which was originally free from censorship, was introduced in Tunisia in 1991, but it 
was not commonly accessible to the public ([25], p. 486). Under the presidency of Ben Ali, Tunisia 
was regarded as one of the most strictly censored countries in the world. The internet was perceived as 
a threat to Ben Ali’s regime and, therefore, websites and keywords were blocked and filtered [26]. 
Emails were also monitored and intercepted if they were suspected of endangering public order [26]. 
Among the websites blocked were included those of political dissidents, human rights agencies, and 
news websites, such as Al-Jazeera in Arabic [26]. Those who attempted to access these websites 
received the ubiquitous “Error 404—page not found” message, which was later nicknamed as the 
“Ammar 404” [26]. The repressive laws under Ben Ali’s dictatorship are also reflected by Tunisia’s 
rank as 184th of 196 countries examined on freedom of print and broadcast media [27]. 
While censorship did not completely disappear in Tunisia after the Jasmine Revolution [28] 
freedom of expression did significantly improve if only for a short period [26]. Under the new regime, 
journalists, bloggers and other members of the public were able to disseminate their ideas and 
participate in political discussion. Filters were also removed on social networking sites such as 
Facebook and YouTube [29]. Notably, under Ben Ali’s regime, Tunisia was placed on the Reporters 
Without Borders’ “Enemies of the Internet” list. In 2011, both Tunisia and Egypt were removed from 
this list. With recent arrests and prison sentences of bloggers and journalists, it is likely that both 
Tunisia and Egypt will find themselves once again on the “enemies of the Internet” list in 2014. 
Although Tunisia is presently in a transition towards democracy, the National Constituent 
Assembly has shown a commitment to protecting freedom of expression under its new constitution. 
This is particularly important given the recognition of the role the internet played in facilitating the 
revolution [30]. On 6 January 2014, freedom of expression was formally included in Tunisia’s new 
Constitution, which has been said to “send a strong message in favour of freedom of expression and 
freedom of information in Tunisia and in the rest of the Arab region” [31]. Yet, some have observed 
that free reporting remains an issue, particularly when it comes to the religion of Islam [24,32,33]. 
Importantly, Tunisia’s new Constitution provides a legal framework protecting freedom of 
expression. The significant provisions in the new Constitution are: Article 31 on freedom of 
expression; Article 32 on access to information; and Article 127 on the Broadcasting Communication 
Laws 2014, 3 680 
 
Agency. While these provisions are not considered to be wholly satisfactory, they indicate a positive 
step towards democracy in Tunisia and in the establishment of a legal framework that seeks to conform 
to international human rights law [34]. It should be noted, however, that it was only due to vigorous 
lobbying by Tunisian activists that amendments were made to the constitution to safeguard the 
independency of the media [35]. 
Optimism, however, for the newly protected right of freedom of expression in the new Constitution 
was short-lived. In May 2014, Tunisian revolutionary blogger Azyz Amami and Sabri Ben Mlouka 
were arrested for possession of drug charges [36]. There has been outcry over these arrests and many 
view them as false charges to disguise censorship and the thwarting of political dissidents. These 
incidents once again highlight that while legal rules and norms are important, they do not ensure the 
violation of human rights both in times of conflict and in their application post-conflict. 
3. The Internet and Related Technologies in Arabic Countries 
The Arab world is constituted by a set of similar states that have historical, religious and ethnic 
commonalities. However, from an economic and policy point of view, these countries constitute 
heterogeneous regions that consist of a succession of partitioned space. In effect, these countries vary 
by their size, as well as by their natural environments and energy, their income levels, their skills and 
human capital, their social and political structures, and their institutions. Consequently, the use of the 
internet in Arab countries is evolving disparately from one country to another. However, generally 
most of these countries appear to be relatively disadvantaged in terms of access to the internet in 
comparison with Western nations, with the exception of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar and to 
a lesser extent, Kuwait and Bahrain [37].  
The digital divide is a problem in Arabic countries. In some Gulf countries, the rate of internet 
penetration has reached between 40% and 50% [37]. In these countries, this high rate of penetration 
has existed for a few years. For example, in the UAE, Qatar, and even in Lebanon, the streets are 
beginning to increasingly resemble those of many developing countries in Asia, where internet cafes 
are flourishing more and more by day. Although in some Arab countries, the rate of internet usage has 
not reached even one per cent [38]. 
The internet was introduced to the Arab World in the mid-90s by larger institutions such as banks 
and oil businesses. By 1999, these networks became very popular among the middle and lower classes, 
despite the regulatory restrictions present in several countries. Today, the majority of internet users are 
young, educated, and speak English. In fact, several studies conducted on internet users living in an 
Arabic speaking country show that the average age of users is 30 years old, 70% have a university 
degree, and 88% could speak English [37]. In Lebanon, young people have also recognised the 
benefits of the internet as a low cost communication tool to interact with their family and friends. In 
other countries, such as Tunisia, the internet was mainly seen as a means which allowed them to 
express themselves freely [37]. 
Social networking sites, as well as online blogs, have played an important role in rallying support 
against oppressive regimes in Arab countries. New technological devices have also disseminated 
information to the public about where events will be held and other information usually censored by 
governments.  This section will consider the blogosphere in Egypt and Tunisia. 
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In both Tunisia and Egypt, the internet has been considered as the key in facilitating wide public 
debate. It is estimated that 3.6 million of the 10.5 million Tunisians have an internet connection. In 
Egypt, it is estimated that of the 80 million people of the population, 17 million have an internet 
connection, which is more than 20% of the population [38]. The Egyptian government was subsidizing 
internet access, seeing it as an important vector of economic development. In Egypt, many internet 
users are young people, the majority of whom have integrated social networking sites in their daily 
life. Approximately five million Egyptians use Facebook [38].  
Before specifically analysing the importance of the internet during the lead up to the revolution, it is 
important to consider internet use in Arab countries prior to this period.  
3.1. Egypt  
3.1.1. Pre-Revolution 
In a report conducted by an organisation focused on internet censorship and new media, Reporters 
Without Borders [26], Egypt was ranked as 148th (out of 169) among the countries that do not respect 
media freedom. The document, which is published on the organisation’s website, has since denounced 
the “censorship practiced by the security apparatus on the electronic sites in Egypt”. It further states that:  
“If you go to an internet café in Egypt, you will find no difficulty to seek out and explore 
the sites, because the network is not subject to a massive filtering. The authorities monitor 
however almost any electronic publication of a political nature, and some sites, especially 
that of the Brotherhood of Muslim Brothers, are the subject of a very strict control” [26]. 
Some Egyptian bloggers are self-censoring their online speech, becoming aware that what they 
publish online could have consequences. As such, they voluntarily close down their blogs, having 
learned from other online incidents where people were arrested and detained. For instance, the 
Egyptian police arrested Kareem Amer for publishing articles on this blog that were considered to be 
anti-religious and an insult to the then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Among the topics covered 
in his blog, Amer criticised the State’s discriminatory policies against women, and in particular, his 
criticism of the Charter of Ethics of Satellite Channels (regarded as a censorship tool), and other arbitrary 
measures taken against the Facebook activists. He was detained for 600 days for these comments [39].  
Despite the arbitrary and severe treatment given to those who dare to freely express their anti-policy 
and anti-government views online, Egyptians continued to boldly use social network tools in hopes of 
spreading information, and to eventually act as a catalyst for change. The popular social networking 
site Facebook was a useful tool used by activists to facilitate the revolution. For example, Esraa Abdel 
Fattah, a young Egyptian girl, used Facebook to co-organise the “6 April 2008 Youth Movement”, a 
political movement that encouraged a workers’ strike against low wages and high food prices [40].  
Another Facebook group “We are all Khaled Said”, was created to gather attention about the death 
of Khaled Said, who was allegedly dragged from an internet café and beaten to death on the streets of 
Alexandria by Egyptian police in June 2010. This group called for the organization of several events to 
protest against corruption, the widespread use of torture, the practices of authorities to enforce law and 
order, fraudulent elections, and the attack on the Church of the Saints in Alexandria. 
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Internet users showed an impressive mastery of social networking sites by disseminating messages 
and uploading pictures to show their support. While President Mubarak was being stripped of his 
powers, the group proudly published in March 2009 a balance sheet of the impact that it had on Egypt. 
According to one source, the posts of the group “We are all Khaled Said” had been viewed as many as 
1.3 billion times. The number of comments on the articles reached a little over 11 million [40]. 
In addition, the activist group “April 6 Youth Movement” used online networking sites to mobilise 
the Egyptian people to rise against the regime in place. As its name indicates, the group was 
constituted by young people, most of whom were aged between 20 and 30 years. Thousands of 
workers in the textile factory Misr Spinning and Weaving (a jewel of the Egyptian industry), located in 
Mahallah Al-Koubra, north of Cairo, were then mobilized to organize a strike. They had demanded 
better wages and were protesting against poor working conditions [41]. 
A group of young people also used Facebook and other new media (such as text messages) to show 
their support of the labour movement and call for a national strike on the 6 April 2008. It was 
estimated that the number of members of this Facebook group was 60,000 and had attracted 65,000 
comments on the articles it had uploaded on its page [42]. 
The watchword of strike, heavily relayed on the internet, had been widely followed throughout 
Egypt. Several Egyptian cities were paralyzed during this social movement; a movement that was 
regarded as the most important one experienced by the country in decades. In response, the authorities 
were quick to arrest hundreds of activists, and had beaten and injured many of those caught. Internet 
users were able to capture this event on Twitter and Facebook and disseminated numerous images 
depicting the suppression of the demonstration. Users also used these sites to publish the names of 
those arrested and advocated for their release. 
However, the Egyptian authorities were not only repressing people on the street, but soon began to 
block sites on the internet, including any sites containing material posted by the April 6 Youth 
Movement. Table 1 below shows the participation of the internet users uploading videos to Youtube 
about the suppression of the revolution in Egypt, since 28 January 2011. 
Table 1. Uploaded videos to Youtube by region [43]. 






3.1.2. Post Revolution 
Given that new technological devices were being used as tools for protest and mobilization, the 
Egyptian government responded quickly. Some mobile phone companies cancelled the subscription of 
any person who did not disclose their personal information (such as their name, address etc.) on their 
identity cards [43]. Approximately 50,000 telephone lines were deleted as a result of this decision. 
Users of internet cafes were also required to submit an identity card and personal information in order 
to be able to access the internet [39]. 
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On 28 March 2011, another Egyptian blogger Maikel Nabil Sanad was arrested and sentenced to 
three years imprisonment for having criticised the transparency of the Egyptian army. He was judged 
by a military court on 10 April 2011, who condemned this young revolutionary for having blogged an 
article entitled: “The army and the People were Never One Hand” [44]. In this very detailed article, the 
blogger argued that although the revolution had managed to eliminate the dictator Hosni Mubarak, it 
had not eliminated the dictatorship in Egypt. He supported his arguments by documents, photos and 
specific events, which stressed that the Egyptian army would have protected its own interests 
throughout the revolution and that it would have never been on the side of the people either before or 
after the revolution. According to the blogger, the army did not really support the revolution in Egypt. 
Nawras-Univers also accuses the Egyptian army not only of torturing activists after the overthrow of 
Mubarak, but also of continuing to manipulate the media, resulting in a new form of censorship 
following the revolution that sought to protect the interests of the army. 
Ahmad Maher, one of the key members of the April 6 Youth Movement, has protested against both 
the Mubarak and Morsi governments, and is a blogger, activist and civil engineer. Maher was detained 
on 29 November 2013 for holding a demonstration against a new Egyptian protest law. He was 
sentenced (together with opposition leaders Ahmed Douma and Mohammed Adel) in December 2013 
to three years in prison as a punishment for protests against recent steps by the Egyptian military 
government. He recently wrote an opinion piece for the Washington Post stating: 
After the coup, I wrote an op-ed in The Post expressing my deep concerns about the 
military’s intervention in the political arena and the dawn of a new era of terror in Egypt. 
The regime has arrested or tainted the reputation of anyone who criticizes its oppression or 
killings under the umbrella of “fighting terrorism”. I feared that I would be arrested and 
charged with terrorism because I voiced my unhappiness with the regime’s actions and its 
human rights abuses.  
Unfortunately, this is exactly what happened. I was arrested November 30 and sentenced in 
December to three years in prison—solitary confinement, along with a fine of 50,000 
Egyptian pounds—because I spoke out against a new law banning protest. Two other 
activists, Mohammed Adel and Ahmed Douma, have been jailed with me. This is blatant 
revenge by the regime over the revolution that I and other members of the April 6 Youth 
Movement had the honour of helping to spark in 2011. The military seeks vengeance 
against any group that had any role in the 25 January 2011, revolution that led to the end of 
the Mubarak regime.  
Perhaps my arrest could be beneficial. It says a lot about the military regime; it has 
confirmed citizens’ fears of a military dictatorship. Egypt’s military authorities do not 
know or respect freedom, democracy or human rights. Slowly, the Mubarak regime is 
coming back to power, and the networks of corruption and oppression are returning. In 
Egypt today, it is as though there had not been a revolution at all [45].  
Tensions ride high in Egypt on the issue of arrests of protesters. Maher lost his case on appeal and is 
now appealing to the Egyptian Court of Cassation.  




Tunisia is among the countries most repressed with regard to the media. This was particularly true 
during the presidency of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. Considered as a threat to the stability and the image 
of the country, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali sought to censor the internet by a strict filtering system, 
harassment of opponents and monitoring. Some URL addresses as well as key words were blocked. 
The filtering was conducted via software such as Smartfilter and Websense, which also allowed the 
surveillance and interception of emails. Filtering and surveillance was performed lawfully under 
Tunisian Penal Law Code whereby “disturbing public order” is an offence [46]. 
However, the authorities claimed only to have blocked terrorist sites or sites of a pornographic 
nature. Yet the censorship applied also to sites of political opposition, independent sites of information, 
and the sites of organisations that defended human rights. This constituted a long list of blocked sites, 
such as: Tunisnews, Nawaat, the sites of the Democratic Progressive Party PDPinfo.org, Al-Nahda 
(Renaissance), Tunisonline, Assabilonline, Reporters Without Borders, and Al-Jazeera in Arabic. 
Internet users who attempted to access these sites received the following message: “Error 404: page 
not found” [47]. This message was given the nickname “Ammar 404” to refer to the authority 
responsible for internet censorship in Tunisia.  
The Facebook accounts of protesters were also hacked by the Tunisian Government [47,48]. Other 
methods used against dissidents included: preventing their internet access, port blocking, the 
transmission of viruses and malware, and the infiltration of discussion forms [49]. 
In societies where individual and collective freedoms are suppressed, the virtual space, which is 
accessible to many people, momentarily replaces the public space. Of importance is that the internet 
offers a model of participatory governance that allows people to engage more deeply in political 
issues. This engagement is not limited to those of high social status and is particularly a preferred place 
for the participation of women in the public debate. Of concern is the inferior treatment of women in 
many Arabic countries where women are often hampered by their family responsibilities.  
3.2.2. Post-Revolution 
In Tunisia, the uprising has been hailed as the internet revolution. Given their ability to connect 
with foreign networks, Tunisian bloggers were able to upload and share events of the revolt in real 
time. Journalists and internet users around the world were able to connect to sites such as Facebook, 
YouTube and the Twitter pages of Slim Amadou, Lina Ben Mhenni as well as many others, in order to 
obtain the latest news on the revolts. While there are still laws prohibiting religious comments contrary 
to Islam, the courts have been reluctant to enforce these laws. There has also not been a move to censor 
or silence opposition, and dissenting views. 
4. Evaluation and Concluding Remarks 
The events that led to the fall of President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt show that social networks are, 
on the political level, much more powerful than was previously assumed. The drivers of the revolution 
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had little means, but with the aid of social networking sites, in particular Facebook, they were able to 
rally support for the revolution. This is because the citizens appreciated the importance of the internet 
to obtain uncensored news. While the Tunisian Government was closely monitoring the use of the 
internet and attempted to limit access, this did not prevent the circumvention of these restrictions by a 
number of internet users who succeeded in concealing their identity from government authorities.  
Similarly, the internet was an important source to access uncensored news for many people 
throughout the Arabic world. Although these countries have a significant amount of television 
channels and independent newspapers, there has always been a limit on the information that could be 
made publicly available, but at the same time there was no limit on the scope of information that could 
be restricted. As one astute political dissident, Steve Ghan, once said, “In Malaysia we have the right 
to freedom of expression. The problem is that we have no rights once we freely express our opinions” [50]. 
The same could be said to be true in many Arabic countries. 
It is also clear that both text messaging and Internet access were suspected by the Egyptian 
authorities of being major causes of the earlier revolt in Tunisia, as the Egyptian government chose to 
shut down mobile networks and Internet access at the end of January 2011, including networks 
majority owned by UK-based multinational Vodafone. This was regulation of censorship by private 
actors: “Companies can find themselves under duress from governments to operate in ways that go 
beyond legally accountable law enforcement activities” [51]. Vodafone and others were following 
direct government censorship orders under the terms of their licenses. The position of mobile ISPs is 
crucial in this respect, as the number of broadband mobile users is expected to exceed that of fixed 
broadband users by 2013, with an especial imbalance in favour of mobile users living under 
dictatorships and in emerging democracies [52]. 
A common thread in the revolutions that occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, and the revolutions that 
progressed in Yemen, Libya, and Syria is the use of social networking sites, especially Facebook and 
YouTube, as a tool for social change [53]. The same use of social networking sites can be seen in the 
repressed uprising that occurred in Bahrain, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia [38]. 
In addition to being a place to socially interact with others on a global scale, these sites were used as an 
instrument of incitement to revolt, and for construction of a model policy alternative to the existing one. 
The Arab world is constituted by a set of similar states that have historical, religious and ethnic 
commonalities. However, from an economic and policy point of view, these countries constitute 
heterogeneous regions that consist of a succession of partitioned space. In effect, these countries vary 
by their size, as well as by their natural environments and energy, their income levels, their skills and 
human capital, their social and political structures, as well as their institutions. Consequently, the use 
of the internet in Arab countries is evolving disparately from one country to another. However, 
generally most of these countries appear to be relatively disadvantaged in terms of access to the 
internet in comparison with Western nations, with the exception of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
Qatar and to a lesser extent, Kuwait and Bahrain. 
Can social networks play the same subversive role in other poor countries subjected to  
authoritarian regimes? 
In many developing countries, internet users have shown the same enthusiasm towards social 
networking sites as users in Tunisia and Egypt. The rate of adoption of social networks is extremely 
high. Unlike other technological developments that emerged in the past, which tended to emerge in 
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developed countries first and then spread to poor countries, social networking sites spread rapidly 
everywhere and not just in developed countries. On 10 December 2010, Facebook’s second largest 
market following the United States was Indonesia, with 32 million users. This was then followed by 
the United Kingdom, then Turkey, France, the Philippines, Mexico, Italy, Canada and India—all 
within the top ten places [53].  
However, some governments have sought to undermine the potential of social networking sites as a 
tool for social change.  
The concerns of some users on the impact of social networking sites may also limit the impact of 
the potential of these sites. These sites, notably Facebook, do not allow dissidents to remain 
anonymous, which could therefore limit their value as a tool in mobilizing the masses. Nonetheless, 
people continue to risk identification and prison. For instance, the Muslim Brothers, an important 
opposition movement officially banned in Egypt, have already launched their own Facebook page. 
Surveillance of online networks, and in particular of social networking sites, remains a challenge 
and a threat to freedom of expression and democracy in many Arab countries. In Freedom House 
report on Internet freedom, the author of the Egyptian chapter states that: 
Restrictions on anonymity and the use of encryption devices make it easier for these 
activists to be monitored and singled out by the authorities. Under Article 64 of the 2003 
Telecommunications Law, the use of encryption devices is prohibited without the written 
consent of the NTRA, the military and national security authorities. In addition, cybercafé 
customers must provide their names, e-mail addresses, and mobile numbers to receive a 
personal identification number (PIN) to access the internet. Further, the 
Telecommunications Law allows the offices of the Presidency, Security, Intelligence, and 
the Administrative Control Authority to obtain citizens’ online information without prior 
consent for cases that concern national security. In 2013, disputes between the military and 
the presidency, controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, led to a politicization of 
intelligence sharing. 
In December 2013, high-level intelligence officials from Egypt and Iran reportedly met in 
Cairo to discuss the development of new Egyptian surveillance and security capabilities 
similar to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The meeting took place 
between Essam al-Haddad, an advisor to President Morsi, and Qassem Soleimani, 
Commander of the IRGC Quds Force responsible for external clandestine operations. 
Observers noted that Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood may have been looking to the IRGC as 
an example to follow; the IRGC was created in the wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution as 
a counterweight to the power of Iran’s traditional military, which the late Supreme Leader 
Ruhollah Khomenei saw as a threat to his power. Similarly, the creation of separate 
security and intelligence structures, independent from the Egyptian military and under the 
direct control of the president, would be an important victory in the ongoing power struggle 
between the military—Egypt’s strongest institution—and the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Regarding cooperation between state security structures and the private sector, ISPs and 
mobile operators are obliged to maintain a database of their customers and to allow the 
government to access their databases. After the ending of a grace period issued by the 
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MCIT, customers who do not have their National ID numbers registered with their phone 
companies will have their phone lines cut. The NTRA suggested that it would suspend 
additional phone numbers for mobile operators who fail to abide by the new rules. In the 
past, details emerged that mobile operators Vodafone, Mobinil, and Etisalat had to sign 
terms of agreement that bound them to cooperate with government officials when 
requested to tap any conversation or monitor any discussion. In an interview, Mobinil 
founder Naguib Sawiris stated that under the company’s terms of agreement, the government 
had the right to cancel any or all mobile services in the absence of cooperation [54].  
While the Muslim Brotherhood is no longer in power, there is no indication that these same 
surveillance methods have been abandoned by the new government. Monitoring of discussions and 
cancelling mobile services is likely to be a factor in Egyptian life. 
The same report on Tunisia gave a somewhat more optimistic view of censorship and online tools in 
comparison with Egypt. The Tunisia report states: 
Censorship has drastically reduced since the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime, which 
employed one of most repressive internet censorship apparatuses in the world. Over the 
past year, there was no evidence of politically-motivated filtering. Popular social media 
tools such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and international blog-hosting services are 
freely available in the country. Crucially, the judiciary did not issue any further verdicts in 
favour of blocking, despite dozens of complaints lodged against the ATI to filter 
“defamatory” Facebook pages.  
Indeed, since the revolution, the judiciary has quickly found itself at the centre of many 
censorship debates, in great deal due to its role of enforcing many of the country’s  
not-yet-reformed laws. For example, in May 2011, the Tunis Permanent Military Tribunal 
ordered the blocking of five Facebook pages on charges of defamation against the military 
and its leaders. The ATI could only implement the verdict for a short period of time, citing 
“technical issues” that occurred as a result of a 15 GB increase in internet traffic and a 
breakdown of filtering machinery. That same month, a Tunis-based primary court ordered 
filtering of X-rated content based on a complaint lodged by three lawyers, who argued that 
the sites were a threat to minors and the country’s Muslim values. After the ATI lost an 
appeal, the verdict was eventually overturned by Tunisia’s highest appeal court, the 
Cassation Court, in February 2012 on the grounds that the ATI lacked the technical 
capacity to implement the mandated filtering. Explaining the reasoning behind the ATI’s 
move to appeal the court verdicts, ATI president Moez Chakchouk stated, “This is not 
about pornography; it’s a matter of principle. In post-revolutionary Tunisia, we are 
determined to break with the former regime’s censorship practices.” Interestingly, although 
the ATI was obliged to practice filtering during the former regime, there is no law that 
formally requires this filtering [55].  
Given the fact that social networking sites and mobile technologies are economic and practical and 
can be more effective that other forms of communications, they have a great capacity to be used in 
order to affect social change. It appears that social networking sites in Arab countries are going to stay 
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provided that they are not blocked—a possible reality in many of these countries. In March 2014, for 
example, the Turkish Prime Minister threatened to ban Twitter altogether [52]. Turkey joins countries 
such as China, Iran, and Vietnam who routinely block Facebook, Twitter and Youtube during times 
when incidents would indicate a likeliness of outrage and dissent. The blocking of social media in 
these countries has been off and on since 2009. While it is true that restrictions of social media attract 
public outcry, the reality is that these blockings are not becoming obsolete. It remains to be seen how 
governments will deal with social media in the wake of new incidents. 
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